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Black/Parallel Markets: When is a Money
Exchanger a Money Launderer?
Wilmer Parker, III*
I. Introduction
In the late 1980s, the U.S. Department of Justice sought the
forfeiture of funds that allegedly were derived from the sale of cocaine
and then laundered and placed in domestic bank accounts. Throughout
this litigation, the government Was confronted by claimants protesting the
restraint of "their" money, which they had acquired through money
exchanges in a "black" or "parallel" market transaction.' The insidious
use of the "black" or "parallel" markets by narco-traffickers in their
attempt to successfully launder drug proceeds constitutes the greatest
subterfuge in their efforts to evade the law. The "black" or "parallel"
markets developed as an alternative means of exchanging local currencies
for U.S. dollars in those countries that engage in restrictive currency
exchange policies, most of which are in Latin America.2 Those involved
with these markets have not only facilitated the deposit of so-called
"flight capital" into financial institutions within the United States, but
have also been proven to have aided and abetted the laundering of
millions of narco-dollars.'
The use of parallel markets to facilitate the laundering of drug-
tainted dollars effectively surfaces the drug proceeds from the
underground economy into the economy of international business. This
process is primarily enacted through a money exchanger and a drug
money broker. As an example, a money exchanger may obtain pesos (or
*B.S., M.B.A., J.D., University of Alabama; LLM (Taxation), Emory University; Assistant United
States Attorney, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia. Portions of this Article were
previously published. See Wilmer Parker, Money or Liberty? A Dilemma For Those Who Aid
Money Launderers, 44 ALA. L. REv. 763 (1993). The opinions expressed herein are the author's and
are not necessarily the opinions of the U.S. Department of Justice.
1. See, e.g., United States v. All Funds on Deposit in any Accounts Maintained at Merill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Daccarett et al., 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993) United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account
No. 90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Hawaii 1991).
2. A noted expert in the field has described a "black" market as a currency market in a
particular country, which is illegal under the laws of that country. A "parallel" market is one that
is separate from the official currency market, but not illegal. See Robert Grosse, Colombia's Black
Market In Foreign Exchange, 22 WORLD DEV. 1193, 1193 (1992). Often litigants cannot agree on
whether a particular market is black, white, gray or something else. For purposes of this article, all
unofficial channels will be referred to as the "parallel market."
3. See supra parts 11, III, IV.
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any other currency) by selling drug dollars to customers who buy the
dollars with the pesos.4 Whether the customers are seeking to convert
their pesos to "flight capital"5 dollars or are merely obtaining dollars for
commercial purposes, the customers request that the money exchanger
transfer the dollars to U.S. bank accounts. With the customer's pesos the
money exchangers "buy" the drug-tainted dollars from the drug money
laundering broker and direct that the drug money broker wire-transfer the
drug dollars to the customer's U.S. bank account.6 In exchange for the
tainted dollars, the money exchanger transfers thepesos received from his
customer to individuals and bank accounts identified by the drug money
broker. The result is that drug-tainted money becomes located in
accounts controlled by entities or individuals who most likely were not
involved whatsoever in the distribution of the drugs or the exchange of
drugs for money. As such, this money exchange creates a "layering
process" that uses international commerce and parallel markets to "clean"
the taint associated with drug money.
While money exchangers and drug money brokers may not have
been involved with the distribution of drugs, they nevertheless are aiders
and abettors in the laundering of millions of drug-dollars. Under the U.S.
4. Typically, at this point, the dollars sold are not controlled by the money exchanger and have
yet to be purchased by the exchanger who is purportedly selling them. Rather, the money exchanger
is presenting dollars offered by a drug money laundering broker for the drug trafficker. The dollars,
originally in the form of cash (bank notes), have through criminal laundering efforts been "placed"
within the international banking system by being "deposited" into bank accounts resulting in a
positive or "credit" balance. The accounts are usually opened in nominee names (often using foreign
"shell" corporations that have no legitimate assets or activity). The subsequent transfer of dollars
from one account to another constitutes in banking terms an "electronic- funds transfer" or "wire
transfer". Two noted investigations of drug money laundering brokers resulted in the identification
of the involvement of the international banking system in facilitating the successful laundering of
millions of narco-dollars. See United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1012 (1989) (involving the transportation of millions of drug dollars in cash from Los
Angeles to London, depositing and wire transferring the monies from London to Miami bank
accounts and elsewhere); United States v. Awan et al., 966 F.2d 1415 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (U.S.
Customs' Operation C-Chase) (involving an undercover investigation of drug money laundering
broker Gonzalo Mora, Jr. and his use of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in
facilitating the successful laundering of millions of dollars in drug proceeds using bank accounts in
Tampa, Miami, London, Geneva and Luxembourg).
5. Flight capital refers to wealth transferred from one country to another by individuals for
"different reasons including personal security (i.e., concerns over the lack of confidentiality of bank
records which has led to violence, extortion and kidnapping) and preservation of wealth (due to the
lack of stability of certain banking systems, high levels of devaluation of local currencies against the
dollar, tax avoidance, and the perception of better investment opportunities available in the United
States)." Alan S. Fine, Of Forfeiture, Facilitation and Foreign Innocent Owners; Is a Bank Account
Containing Parallel Market Funds Fair Game, 16 NOVA L. REV. 1125, 1132 (1992).
6. Specifically, the money exchanger identifies the customer's bank account number.
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Drug Abuse Prevention Act,7 one who "knowingly" aids and abets the
laundering of drug proceeds is liable under the criminal laws of the
United States, just as if one had conspired to distribute the controlled
substance.' This Act also provides for forfeiture of:
All monies, negotiable instruments, securities or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for
a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments
and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation
of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph to the extent of the interest of an owner by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge and consent of that owner.9
Those involved in using parallel markets also may be found to have
violated the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 [hereinafter
MLCA].' ° Under the MLCA, one who knows that property involved in
a financial transaction represents proceeds of some form of unlawful
7. Drug Abuse Prevention Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1988).
8. See Drug Abuse Prevention Act, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988); United States v. Broadwell, 870
F.2d 594, 607-08 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989) (stating that a person may be guilty
as an aider and abettor, even though he did not know "the means" his principal used in committing
the crime); United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1080 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 845
(1984).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. 1993). In the Senate hearings debating the
proposed money laundering legislation, the concept of a money exchanger being held criminally
liable as a money launderer for activities involved in the business markets was recognized.
The "knowing" scienter requirements are intended to be construed, like existing
"knowing" scienter requirements, to include instances of "willful blindness". See United
States v. Jewel, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S. 951 (1976). Thus, a
currency exchanger who participates in a transaction with a known drug dealer involving
hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash and accepts a commission far above the market
rate, could not escape conviction, from the first tier of the offense, simply by claiming
that he did not know for sure that the currency involved in the transaction was derived
from the crime. On the other hand, an automobile car dealer who sells a car at market
rates to a person whom he merely suspects of involvement with crime, cannot be
convicted of this offense in the absence of a showing that he knew something more about
the transaction or the circumstances surrounding it. Similarly, the "intent to facilitate"
language of the section is intended to encompass situations like those prosecuted under
the aiding and abetting statute in which a defendant knowingly furnishes substantial
assistance to a person whom her or she is aware will use that assistance to commit a
crime. See, e.g., Baclkun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940) (emphasis
added).
S. REP. NO. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1986).
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activity, yet continues to conduct or attempt to conduct the transaction
with such property, will be liable for imprisonment or criminal fines."
Similar to the Drug Prevention Control Act, the MLCA mandates
that any property or proceeds resulting from the illegal money laundering
activities "shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States, unless the
claimant satisfies the "innocent owner' defense."'" "Innocent owners"
are those who, without knowledge, engage in financial transactions that
involve property that resulted from illegal activities. 3
Simply put, the difference between an innocent money exchanger,
involved in the parallel market, and a knowing money launderer is
knowledge of whether the dollars being bought and sold are drug tainted.
Those who engage in financial transactions with a money exchanger,
knowing that they are assisting the successful laundering of drug
proceeds, are susceptible to criminal prosecution. The ability of the
government to initiate such actions, however, is solely dependent on the
government's ability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
had knowledge.
In contrast, the burden of proving that the defendants had knowledge
is not present in forfeiture actions initiated against accounts that received
drug-tainted monies through exchanges on the parallel market. As noted
by one U.S. court: "The substantive law, procedures, and allocation of
burdens of proof in forfeiture cases differ markedly from other civil
proceedings, and give the United States prosecutor a substantial edge."' 4
This article surveys the recent forfeiture actions instituted by the
U.S. Department of Justice, as a part of its continuing attempt to seize
laundered drug money. Such actions, including Operation Polar Cap--
Phase IV, the Hawaii All Monies Case, and the New York All Funds
Case, are discussed in parts II, III, and IV respectively. Part V then
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1988&Supp. 1993).
12. Id. § 981(a)(1)(A).
13. Id. § 981(a)(2).
14. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (providing for the burdens of proof in forfeiture
actions); United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts Maintained at Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) aff'd sub noma., United States v. Daccarett et al.,
6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993); Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, A Guide to Handling Federal
Narcotics Forfeiture Cases, 79 ILL. B.J. 180 (1991) (discussing forfeiture procedures). Once
probable cause has been shown to ajudge by the government to initiate  forfeiture action, then those
seeking claims to the forfeitable property have the burden of proving their entitlement to the property.
Accordingly, standing is a threshold issue for a claimant. Once standing is shown, then a claimant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that either the property did not come from illegal
drug and money laundering transactions or that the claimant did not know or through willful
blindness avoided learning that the source and nature of the property came from drug and money
laundering transactions. In many forfeiture actions, it is incumbent on a claimant to prove a negative
fact, such as a lack of knowledge or consent.
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chronicles the successful international efforts in bringing drug money
laundering organizations to justice. Finally, in Part VI, it is recognized
that those who participate in black or parallel markets face an increased
risk of prosecution by the U.S. government.
II. Operation Polar Cap - Phase IV
In 1989, the U.S. government, in Operation Polar Cap, initiated a
series of criminal prosecutions against the then-largest existing association
of individuals and corporations involved in laundering drug dollars. This
association, collectively-referred to as La Mina, laundered millions of
drug dollars by and on behalf of Pablo Escobar and other notorious
members of the Medellin Cartel. 5 In April 1990, subsequent to the
receipt of Panamanian bank records, the government sought restraining
orders against more than one thousand U.S. domestic bank accounts.'
6
The restraint of the monies expected to be found in the domestic
accounts was premised on an analysis of the Panamanian bank records of
Banco de Occidente (Panama), S.A., a criminal corporate defendant in the
Atlanta Polar Cap indictment.' 7 The bank admitted its complicity in
August of 1989 by pleading guilty to criminal charges of aiding and
abetting drug money laundering broker Eduardo Martinez and others in
the illegal laundering of millions of drug dollars on behalf of the
Medellin Cartel.'"
The Panamanian bank records analyzed were of nominee accounts
("shell corporations") controlled by Eduardo Martinez.' 9 The Martinez
Panamanian nominee accounts, previously identified through U.S. bank
15. See United States v. Koyomejian, et al., 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, -
U.S. ___ 113 S. Ct. 617 (1992); United States v. Saccoccia, 823 F. Supp. 994 (D.R.I. 1993); United
States v. Eighty-eight (88) Designated Accounts Containing Monies Traceable to Exchanges of
Controlled Substances, 740 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
16. The restraining orders were sought under § 853(e) of the Drug Abuse Prevention Act, which
provides for the restraint of assets derived from the underlying criminal activity believed to be owned
or controlled by the putative criminal defendant. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988). See United States v.
Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1348-54 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 876 (1989). The Fourth and
Second Circuits have also held that "substitute assets" (assets of a defendant not derived from the
underlying criminal activity) may be restrained pre-trial. See In re Assets of Billman, 915 F.2d 916
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 500 U.S. 952 (1991); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1988). The Ninth and Fifth Circuits hold that § 853 does not allow the pre-conviction restraint of
a defendant's substitute assets. See Onited States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993), reh 'g denied, 997 F.2d 883 (1993). A recent decision
within the Eighth Circuit agrees with the Fifth and Ninth Circuit opinions. See United States v. Field
et al., 867 F. Supp. 869 (D. Minn. 1994).
17. See Eighty-eight (88) Designated Accounts, 740 F.Supp. at 844-47.
18. Id. at 847.
19. Id. at 844.
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records of a Florida gold refiner, received, via electronic fund transfers,
laundered drug monies that La Mina had collected in New York,
Houston, Los Angeles, and Miami. In a process reminiscent of a shell
game at a country fair, the laundered money was received in Panama,
transferred within the bank to secondary and tertiary accounts, and
subsequently wire transferred from Banco de Occidente (Panama),
S.A. 2" The approximately one-thousand U.S. domestic accounts into
which the drug-tainted monies were traced from the Martinez accounts
were the accounts frozen by the restraining order.2" Prior to the restraint
of the U.S. accounts, the government knew through independent
investigations that some of the accounts had been used to facilitate the
purchase of aircraft later used to smuggle cocaine.22
Following the issuance of the restraining order, the government was
informed by various counsel for the account owners or by the account
owners themselves that many of the frozen accounts were owned and
controlled by individuals and entities claiming to be putative innocent
owners who had obtained their money through Colombian parallel
markets.23 Overwhelmed by the unexpected interrelationship between
the clearly corrupt Panamanian accounts controlled by drug money
launderer Eduardo Martinez and the owners of many of the U.S. accounts
alleging "innocent ownership," the government did not oppose
modification of the restraining order to release monies in most of the
accounts.24 In United States v. Eighty-eight (88) Designated Accounts
Containing Monies Traceable to Exchanges of Controlled Substances,"
the government did, however, initiate a civil forfeiture action in the
Southern District of Florida against eighty-eight of the accounts.
20. Id. at 847.
21. Further evaluation of the Panamanian bank records revealed that millions of drug dollars
received by Eduardo Martinez were transferred within Panama to an account or accounts controlled
by a purported Colombian money exchanger who subsequently transferred various monies to many
of the same U.S. accounts frozen by the restraining order. The accounts controlled by the money
exchanger were also maintained in nominee names.
22. Eighty-eight (88) Designated Accounts, 740 F.Supp. at 844.
23. Many account owners were incensed by the suggestion that they were in some manner
involved with Pablo Escobar and other drug traffickers. Much ire was leveled at the government for
its perceived faulty investigation. From the government's perspective, it was simply tracing money
to accounts where it could exercise legal jurisdiction to initiate action to clear title to the accounts'
contents. The burden of proving that the account owner was an innocent holder of the drug-tainted
dollars was on the claimant, not the government. Therefore, the government was not required to
investigate prior to restraint.
24. See Eighty-eight (88) Designated Accounts, 740 F.Supp. at 844 n.2.
25. See id.
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1II. Hawaii All Monies Case
Contemporaneous with the Florida Eighty-eight (88) Designated
Accounts litigation in Operation Polar Cap, the government in a related
investigation initiated forfeiture proceedings in Hawaii in United States
v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3.26 The Hawaii
investigation involved bank accounts implicated in drug money
laundering wherein the claimants' alleged innocent ownership of the
tainted money was based directly on currency exchanges in the parallel
markets of Peru.27
The relevant facts of that litigation reflected that Emilio Melendez
and his brother Carlos were members of a drug trafficking organization
in Peru.2' To assist in the laundering of their revenues, the Melendez
organization used the services of two professional money exchangers,
Maria Elena Sarria and Luz Mary Aguad.2 Sarria and Aguad ran
"Dirimex", a money exchange house ("cambio") in Peru that specialized
in the exchange of U.S. dollars for Peruvian intis.3 ° Emilio Melendez
brought to Dirimex the U.S. dollars earned by the organization through
drug trafficking."a Dirimex would "launder" these U.S. dollars by
selling them to Peruvian capitalists through the black or parallel market
in Lima. Business people would pay for the dollars with Peruvian
currency to carry out the money laundering scheme. Sarria, Aguad, and
Melendez would usually transfer the illegal dollars by wire to their own
accounts in the United States.32 There, the money would be wired to
the Peruvian business peoples' accounts held in New York and Miami.33
Emilio Melendez and his organization would then use the Peruvian intis
to purchase raw materials necessary for their drug operations.34 Another
laundering method involved direct transfers from accounts of the
Medellin Cartel to the Peruvian business peoples' accounts in New York
and Miami."
26. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp. 1467
(D. Hawaii, 1991).
27. Id. at 1469.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1469.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
13 DICK. J. INT'L L. SPRING 1995
The claimant in the All Monies case was Henry Lelouch, who owned
another Peruvian cambio.3 6 Like Aquad and Sarria, a major part of
LeLouch's business was the buying and selling of U.S. dollars and
Peruvian intis.37 LeLouch maintained his own bank account under the
name "Ontivero" at the Israel Discount Bank in New York. 8 This
account received several deposits of dollars from the Melendez
organization, which had been laundered by the Sarria organization.39
The funds in the Ontivero account were seized, and the government
sought forfeiture of the funds in Hawaii, where the criminal prosecution
had been brought against Emilio Melendez and others.40  The
government sought the forfeitures of the money based upon five
alternative grounds. The court, in granting partial summary judgment in
favor of the government, found that the property was forfeitable under the
forfeiture provisions of either the Drug Abuse Prevention Act or the
MLCA.4'
The facts presented by the government in the Hawaii litigation
reflected that drug-tainted dollars had been wire transferred from Eduardo
Martinez' bank accounts at Banco de Occidente (Panama), S.A. to
Lelouch's Ontivero account at the Israel Discount Bank in New York.42
The court found that the monies transferred from the Martinez accounts
were narco-dollars.43  Furthermore, the court found that the money
exchangers, Sarria, Aguad, and Melendez likewise transferred narco-
dollars to the Ontivero account." While recognizing that the Ontivero
account received "legitimate" monies through Lelouch's cambio
operation, the court nonetheless found that:
The account provided a repository for the drug proceeds in which the
legitimate money could provide a "cover" for those proceeds, thus
making it more difficult to trace the proceeds. There is, therefore,
probable cause to believe that all of the money in the Ontivero
account facilitated the illegal activities of the Melendez and Dirimex
organizations, making the entire account forfeitable under either 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(A) or 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).45
36. All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1470.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(C) (1988 & Supp. 1993); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp.
1993).
42. All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1470.
43. Id. at 1475.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1475-76. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving the forfeiture
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The court then addressed the issue of whether Lelouch should be
granted summary judgment based on his claim of "innocent ownership"
of the seized monies. The court found that there were, "[m]aterial issues
of fact ... as to whether Lelouch knew or should have known that his
account was receiving tainted money or was facilitating illegal activities.
Material issues of fact exist as to whether Lelouch took all reasonable
steps to prevent his account from being used for illegal activities."46
The court further noted that financial institutions that engage in
transactions with customers that are not economically advantageous may
be deemed to have knowledge of their customer's illegal activities.47 As
such, this precludes the financial institution from being "innocent." As
stated by the Court:
Our district courts have addressed similar issues relating to banks. In
United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 6960
Miraflores Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida, the government had
probable cause to believe that Indalecio Iglesias bought real property
of monies derived from the fraudulent sales of stereo speakers, rejected the facilitation theory of
forfeiting in toto an account under § 981:
An "account" is a name, a routing device like the address of a building; the money is a
"property". Once we distinguish the money from its container, it also follows that the
presence of one illegal dollar in an account does not taint the rest as if the dollar obtained
from fraud were like a drop of ink falling into a glass of water. To the extent United
States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, and United States v. All
Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3 treat the account as the "property" for
purposes of 981, we disapprove of their holdings.
United States v. $448,342.85 et al., 969 F.2d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1992).
Black's Law Dictionary defines an account as "a detailed statement of the mutual demands in
the nature of debit and credit between parties, arising out of contracts or some fiduciary relation."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 18 (6th ed. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. 15603 85th
Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (1 lth Cir. 1991), recognized the "ink" analysis and ruled that,
when an individual with actual knowledge of the illegal activity commingles tainted money with
"clean" money, all of the money found within the account may be forfeited, since one with actual
knowledge cannot be deemed to be an innocent owner. But see United States v. Account No. 50-
2830-2, Located at First Bank, 857 F. Supp. 1534 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (comparing the "ink" analysis
of the Seventh Circuit to an account that received monies from alleged structuring violations of 31
U.S.C. § 5324 to the facilitation theory of forfeiture in the All Monies case). Further, § 1522(a) of
the Annanzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4063-64
(1992), created a new civil forfeiture statute providing for the forfeiture of all monies in a bank
account that equal the amount illegally received by that account within one year of the establishment
of probable cause, regardless of whether the monies currently in the account are "clean". See 18
U.S.C. § 984 (1992). The theory of the forfeiture of the money is a "proceeds" theory and one that
recognizes an account balance as an intangible fungibly property interest. See Marine Midland Bank,
N.A. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that in a § 984 forfeiture, the
government no longer is required to show that money in a bank account is the specific money
involved in the underlying offense).
46. All Monies, 754 F. Supp. at 1482.
47. Id. at 1476-79.
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and constructed a residence worth $1.2 million with drug profits.
Upon learning of an Internal Revenue Service investigation, Iglesias
obtained a mortgage from Republic National Bank of Miami
(Republic) for $800,000. After approving the loan, Republic
transferred the loan proceeds to a Swiss bank account through two
cashier's checks. At the time of the loan, Iglesias had listed the house
for sale.4"
In essence, in terms unmistaken in simplicity, the All Monies court
identified the issue of being an "innocent owner" in "black" and "white"
constants. There is no "gray" innocent owner. All persons and entities
connected with the property subject to forfeiture are wrongdoers except
those who are innocent owners. Innocent owners are those who have no
knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the
illegal activities.49 The court further held that because the burden of
proving "innocent ownership" is on those asserting the defense, the
government need not investigate potential claims prior to restraint or
48. Id. In the One Single Family Residence case cited by the All Monies court, Republic's
contribution consisted of legitimate funds. Nonetheless, the district court denied Republic's innocent
owner claim, finding that the facts when considered in their totality suggested Republic knew of
Iglesias' illegal activities. United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 6960 Miraflores
Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida, 731 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). Republic appealed, but the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, for lack of jurisdiction. See 932 F.2d 1433 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal and remanded the
case for consideration on its merits. __ U.S. 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992). On remand, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court made erroneous findings of fact and that Republic,
without actual knowledge of Iglesias' illegal activities, must be deemed an innocent owner. U.S. v.
One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1993).
49. See United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (1 1th Cir. 1991). In
15603 85th Avenue North, the Eleventh Circuit held that whether an account owner can prevent
forfeiture of the entire account depends on the owner's knowledge, not the government's ability to
prove that all monies in the account were tainted. Moreover, when a claimant to a forfeiture action
has actual knowledge, at any time prior to the initiation of the forfeiture proceeding, that claimant's
legitimate funds are commingled with drug proceeds, the legitimate funds are also subject to
forfeiture.
However, the Supreme Court in Austin v. United States, __ U.S.____ 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993)
held that under a facilitation theory of forfeiture, the government may be prohibited from forfeiting
an entire res, as it may violate the Eighth Amendment prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines.
Some post-Austin courts post have adopted the "substantial connection" test. See United States v.
Myers, 21 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Premises known as RR #1, 14 F.3d
864 (3d Cir. 1994) (adopting a value of property test); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property
Located at 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Real Property
Located at 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F.Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. Real
Property Known and Numbered as 429 South Main Street, 843 F.Supp. 337, 341-342 (S.D. Ohio
1993) (adopting a multi-factor test weighing "harshness" of the forfeiture vis-a-vis the underlying
crime); United States v. Real Property Located at 2828 N. 54th Street, 829 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Wis.
1993) (adopting a quantitative test).
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seizure of the money in a bank account.5" The government's burden is
merely to adduce sufficient evidence to, prove the existence of "probable
cause for belief' that a substantial link exists connecting the defendant
property to the exchange of a controlled substance."
IV. New York All Funds Case
52
In June 1990, associates of Jose Santacruz-Londono, an alleged
member of the Cali Cartel who was indicted for extensive narcotics
and money laundering activities, were arrested on money laundering
charges by Luxembourg officials.53 Immediately after the arrests, a
"flurry of wire transfer activity" occurred when European banks
received instructions to electronically transfer millions of dollars to
beneficiaries who maintained accounts in branches of Colombian
banks.5 '4 Based on action taken by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Eastern District of New York, U.S. intermediary banks, functioning as
correspondent banks of both the European banks and the Colombian
banks, were instructed to "freeze" all monies designated for certain
named customers of the Colombian banks.55 In excess of ten million
dollars was seized by the government, which initiated the forfeiture
actions pursuant to the forfeiture provisions of the Drug Abuse
Prevention Act and the MLCA.5
6
The account holders engaged in an aggressive assault against the
seizure, including the filing of a separate action against the U.S.
intermediary banks for, among other things, the loss of use of their
money." The claimants, primarily Colombian businesses, alleged
50. Other courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have adopted the "all reasonable
efforts" language for forfeiture action under § 881 (a)(6) of the Drug Abuse Prevention Act. See
United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976 (11 th Cir. 1991). In 15603 85th Avenue
North, the court recognized that once probable cause is established by the government, the burden
of proof shifts to the purported "innocent owner" to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
a defense to the forfeiture. Id. at 979. The burden is met either by rebutting the government's
evidence that the property was purchased with proceeds of illegal drug activities or a showing that
the claimant is an "innocent owner" who did not know of the property's connection with drug sales.
Id. Accord United States v. Two Parcels of Property at Castle Street, 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
51. See United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 903
(1 Ith Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. Eighty-eight (88) Designated
Accounts, 740 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
52. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in any Accounts Maintained at Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Daccarett et
al., 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. 1993); 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
57. See Industrias Marathon Ltda. v. Manufactoras Hanover Trust Co., 792 F. Supp. 180
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that they had lawfully acquired the seized dollars through currency
exchanges on the Colombian "parallel" market.5' The district court
dismissed the complaint against the U.S. banks finding no merit to the
plaintiffs claims. 9 Noting the banks' compliance with government
requests and subpoenas and court orders, the court concluded that
".. . those who assist the government are not liable to those who claim
ownership of what the government contends is already forfeited by the
taint of drug trafficking."60 Although many of the grounds for relief
raised by the claimants required extensive legal analysis in discounting
their validity, the central legal principle undermining the plaintiffs
position was the "relation-back doctrine" of forfeiture law.
The U.S. government notified the New York banks by telephone
that certain electronic funds transfers would be credited to the banks
from European sending banks.6 The New York banks then
examined all incoming wire transfers for their correspondent banks in
Columbia, notifying the U.S. Attorney of all transfers designated for
the identified beneficiaries.62 In addition, the banks notified the U.S.
Attorney of other wire transfers to third-party beneficiaries and
awaiting notification of whether those funds were intended for "related
individuals and entities" and should also be seized.63 Acting on oral
instructions, the New York banks "froze" the tainted monies.64 The
government then sought seizure warrants against the money, thus
initiating legal process.6" The banks in this case, acting at the
discretion of the government, seized money which the government
considered its own because of the taint of narcotics trafficking.
The forfeiture case was subsequently tried before a jury, which
returned verdicts in favor of the government and against eighteen of
twenty-two claimants.66 Thus, in United States v. All Funds On
Deposit In Any Accounts Maintained At Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
and Smith (All Funds), the court, in denying post-verdict motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, found that the interrelationship
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
58. Id. at 185.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 187-88.
61. See id. at 185.
62. Industrias Marathon Ltda., 792 F. Supp. at 184.
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. All Funds, 754 F. Supp. at 987.
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of the "parallel" market did aid and abet the drug money laundering
activities of the Cali Cartel.
Most of the funds seized and forfeited were proceeds of the Cali
Cartel, led by Jose Santacruz Londono.67 Londono and others
conducted extensive narcotics trafficking and money laundering
activities involving hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of
kilograms of cocaine smuggled into the United States.68 These
activities included using international electronic fund transfers from
companies nominally in the clothing, manufacturing or import-export
business; driving cars packed with cocaine from Florida to New York,
where the drugs were exchanged for cash, which was returned to
Florida; flying huge amounts of cash to Panama, and depositing it in
banks; exchanging drug dollars on the parallel market in Colombia for
Colombian pesos; shipping manufactured goods from Colombia to
Panama to cover up dollar transfers; and many other procedures used
to disguise the true source and nature of the funds.69
In short, the New York All Funds case is a classic example of the
infusion of the underground economy into the world of international
commerce. This world is a world in which participants choose to
conduct their business in secret ways to protect their competitive
advantage, to avoid paying duties of taxes and to conceal their wealth.
This is a world of "flight capital"; a world involving cambios or
money exchangers; and a world involving the use of U.S. money
derived from illicit transactions conducted within the United States.
Into this world the government has ventured seeking forfeitable
property. Courts have held that "those who normally do business with
drug dealers do so at their own risk."7 Those who engage in money
exchanges with drug-tainted dollars in the parallel market likewise do
so at their own risk.7'
V. International Efforts
The unquestioned documented symbiotic relationship between the
"parallel" markets and the dollars generated by narcotic trafficking
organizations exposes all money exchangers, together with those who use
67. Id. at 987.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 987-88.
70. United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 905 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
71. Testimony at the New York All Monies trial revealed an officially-sanctioned parallel street
market for drug dollars in Colombia. There was testimony that it was common knowledge in the
streets and board rooms of Colombia that the source of the millions of U.S. dollars in circulation in
the "black" market was largely the drug trade in New York and other U.S. cities.
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their services, to the potential loss of liberty, through prison sentences
invoked as aiders and abettors in laundering drug money, in addition to
the loss of property, through the forfeiture of such drug money.
Operation Polar Cap and other government investigations into the
complexities of the schemes used by the money launderers employed by
the cartels of Colombia have identified numerous individuals, and
brokers, who actively seek to purchase drug dollars generated from the
sale of cocaine. The purchase of the drug dollars by the cambista is
accomplished through the "exchange" of pesos, intis, or any other
currency, including currencies of many European nations.72 The broker
in turn negotiates to purchase drug dollars from the narco-traffickers.
The broker concludes the deal by instructing the money exchanger to
release the foreign currencies to the narco-trafficker and correspondingly
causing the drug dollars to be transferred to "legitimate accounts"
designated by the money exchanger.73
In the context of international criminal organizations, many putative
defendants remain outside the jurisdiction of the United States and
therefore, beyond traditional means of arrest. Without question, the most
culpable narco-traffickers have evaded arrest. Their criminal activities
are motivated by greed. Indeed, one may view their conduct as a
business: A deadly business in which breaches of "oral contracts" are
adjudicated by sicarios (assassins) rather than in a court of law.
Effective law enforcement against these cartels requires coordination
among nations. In September 1992, law enforcement authorities from the
United States, Colombia, and Italy announced the arrests of over 160
individuals, the seizure of multiple kilograms of cocaine and the seizure
of millions of drug tainted dollars all related to the laundering of money
from sales of cocaine by the Sicilian Mafia and the Cali Cartel.74
Operation Green Ice was yet another coordinated effort among law
enforcement authorities to bring to justice narco-traffickers and their
72. See supra note 30.
73. The process of converting the cash derived from the sale of drugs into an intangible
property interest represented by a positive "account" balance at a financial institution is the first step
in the laundering process. La Mina performed this service in the Polar Cap case and was the initial
focus of the government investigatioo. The Colombian money launderers called the organization,
La Mina, the mine, because of its use of purported imported gold to justify the large quantities of
cash being deposited in Los Angeles banks by individuals who claimed to sell jewelry. Once in the
banking system, the drug-tainted monies were wired to numerous accounts throughout the world,
including the nominee accounts atBanco de Occidente (Panama) S.A., controlled by Colombian drug
money broker Eduardo Martinez. See RACHEL EHRENFELD, EVIL MONEY: ENCOUNTERS ALONG
THE MONEY TRAIL, 57-122 (1992).
74. Robert Pear, 3 Nations Stage Anti-Drug Sweep: US., Colombia and Italy Seize 165 in
Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992.
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money launderers. As reported, the investigation involved undercover
penetration of drug money laundering organizations servicing both the
Sicilian and Colombian criminal organizations. Through this penetration,
the government discovered yet another case of attempts to conceal drug
monies through international commerce vis-a-vis accounts at large
commercial banks in the United States. Monies seized by the government
in U.S. banks accounts were claimed to be owned by "business" people
who purchased the dollars in the parallel market.
Still more recently, on December 16, 1994, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration Administrator Thomas Constantine and
International Revenue Service Commissioner Margaret Richardson
announced Operation Dinero, the culmination of a two-year joint
enforcement drug money laundering operation coordinated among the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Nationalization Service and
international law enforcement counterparts in the United Kingdom,
Canada, Italy and Spain." Operation Dinero resulted in eighty-eight
arrests, the seizure of approximately nine tons of cocaine, as well as over
$50 million in cash and other property, including masterpieces of art by
Peter Paul Reubens, Pablo Picasso and Sir Joshua Reynolds. The
investigation, which started in Atlanta, involved the first use of an
undercover bank authorized by the United Kingdom and operated by
Atlanta Drug Enforcement Administration office and Internal Revenue
Service personnel.76
The first phase of the operation focused on undercover money
pickups that identified the connection between drug trafficking and drug
cell money groups in the United States. The second phase focused on the
operation of a private "Class B" bank established in Anguilla, British
West Indies. Once the bank became operational, the government worked
undercover to promote the bank's services within the international
criminal community, including the Cali Cartel in Colombia and the Italian
Mafia."
As a result of opening accounts for various Colombian drug
trafficking and money laundering organizations, the government gained
a wealth of knowledge concerning methods used by the traffickers,
including the use of the parallel markets to facilitate drug money
laundering. Through a review of the documentation surrounding the
75. Michael Janofsky, Fake Bank Set Up By US. Agents Snares Drug Money Launderers, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1994.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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monies coming into the account and orders for disbursements, the
government gained intelligence that led to related investigations in other
jurisdictions throughout the United States and abroad.
Two European investigations were also initiated as a result of this
intelligence. First, Operation Dinero targeted the criminal network of the
Locatelli organization which operated in France, Romania, Croatia, Spain,
Greece, Italy and Canada. This Italian crime organization headed by
Pasquale Locatelli was directly linked to the Cali Mafia. Locatelli was
serving a twenty-year sentence for drug distribution in a French prison,
when he escaped by helicopter in a dramatic shootout with French
officials. On September 6, 1994, however, Locatelli was arrested in
Spain. In addition, the Italian and Spanish investigation of this
organization resulted in the arrest of numerous mafia-organized crime
subjects in Italy, as well as key individuals in Spain."8
The Locatelli organization used ships off the coast of Colombia to
pick up drugs that were transported near the coast of North Africa, where
smaller boats were sent out from Southern Europe to intercept the
shipments. Also, a vessel tied to the organization was intercepted by
NATO forces suspecting that the ship was smuggling arms in violation
of the United Nations arms embargo concerning Bosnia. The ship was
taken to an Italian port and searched resulting in the seizure of small arms
and ammunition. A second Italian investigation uncovered three
supermarkets and a car rental business in Rome used to launder drug
money. 9
Most recently, evidence has been publicized identifying the
economic risks attributed to parallel markets' use to facilitate drug money
laundering activities. In a detailed analysis of Mexico's current economic
turmoil, including the devaluation of the Mexican peso, the Washington
Post asserted that Mexican drug cartels' expanding drug trade while
contributing to "a web of corruption and complicity among Mexico's
rulers also was partially responsible for the peso's devaluation. 80
Increasing the cost of engaging in the illegal business of drug money
laundering is one form of deterrence. Disruption of an efficient money
laundering scheme increases the cost of doing business. Forfeiture laws
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Tod Robberson and Douglas Farah, Mexican Cartels Expanding Role In Trafficking, WASH.
POST, March 12, 1995 ("Experts say the Mexican [narcotics organizations] have built a financial
empire using the country's booming tourist industry and stock market, converting billions of dollars
in drug profits into legitimate forms of capital that are integral to Mexico's financial health Bankers
here are not discounting the possibility that the December financial crunch that led to the peso's
devaluation was the result at least in part, of a massive transfer of drug money from the country").
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are tools provided by the U.S. Congress to U.S. law enforcement agencies
that can be used to disrupt the business of money laundering, as the
ability of the government to "freeze," seize and forfeit tainted monies
derived from criminal violations of U.S. law poses risks of loss that
increase the cost of doing business by all who deal with tainted money.
With increased assistance from foreign governments, including providing
banking information of financial transactions with cambista, the U.S.
government will enhance its ability to seize and forfeit drug dollars.
VI. Conclusion
It has been written that the government's efforts to combat drug
money laundering through the seizing of U.S. bank accounts owned or
controlled by foreigners without "selectivity" has "imposed significant
hardship on hundreds if not thousands of innocent bystanders in our war
on drugs."'" Selectivity implies that the government should
"investigate" the owner of the account prior to the restraint. There is no
such legal requirement.
The courts have held that those who knowingly deal with drug
traffickers do so at their own risk. A drug money broker with knowledge
that he is aiding and abetting a drug trafficker is just as guilty as the drug
trafficker. A money exchanger who knowingly aid and abets a drug
money broker is just as guilty as the drug trafficker. A customer of a
money exchanger who knowingly aids and abets a drug money broker by
purchasing drug dollars through a parallel market exchange with a cambio
is just as guilty as the drug trafficker. If the government sought to bring
criminal charges against such a customer, then it must investigate the
state of knowledge of the customer. It need not investigate such
knowledge to initiate a forfeiture action.82 Those who choose to obtain
dollars from the black or parallel market face an increased risk of
litigation against the U.S. government. This risk, if quantified, may
prove to outweigh the difference in the official exchange rate and the
parallel market rate. A prudent business person would be wise to choose
the less risky method of purchasing dollars.
81. Fine, supra note 5, at 1160.
82. The government likewise need not accept at face value the putative innocent owner's
protestations that he dealt with a reputable cambio and did not know that the dollars he purchased
were drug-tainted. As with any witness, a thorough cross-examination, including questioning about
the parallel market, is relevant to the credibility of the claimant-witness.

